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THE ROADS OF AFRICA
1" A..~ 0" tit" tvJen/.lI-fiftlt cm"iwr~ oJ t1tfI BolMIIt1i., RfIlKJlulion.,
Stal,,, did noC «111 mucA about tJae ll"fllKJlWKm wAic.\ M. WlU eeIebraIing. IuIfIad,
All "..,.,lonetI t1tfI ,wu.. "HC01Id fro"''' tAirlu" "mel and bla".. t1tfI ab_ oj iC
Jor 1M dt/.. oj 1M Red Amtr i" 1942.
n. rtlaIiofu 6eNwn 1M &ttkl U"Km and iU aUiu AGel reaeW .tUM II
degrN oJ kuion and loU oJ~ durift{llAi6 aululllftlAal t1tfI Angio·AI'IMf'icaft"
IOllI'8 Jorud to 00 fIOfItfII1Iift{l iJ tJaq did noC wA 10 IoH IMi,. Ruuia" oUr, (U IMy
Juad 0"" beJore, tw"nI.tI-JlfJe 1/fIlJ"" Q{IO. ~ Juad laugM tIaem tllal they could 'wi
uIabl..A a HCOnd JroAl in Europe. TAlli,. offflftlrivtJ agaiM Rommel'. armtu undD"
t4km toward8 tIafI "nd of Oclober from tIafI Ni~ WlU rIOt recogniud by Stalin in Ailf
~ all a aub.fitulll for the "ncorad froAI" and Wall almoM compldel1l ignored in
11M s-iM preM. Sometlaillg more importan/. and more 8pectocular Wall n_«1'1/.
AltAougA tAerll ill a wUk flad of adWIl aO(J~ 0" tM &t1i.eI teNUm front
for tAlI large Anglo.....mu«:an anrtiu, tit" lacl: oJ COft/Ukrtee bet_ tA. IJolJwt,;.,
and copiloli" po"',~r. of tA" "United NatioM" .. Ja,. 100 great for t1tfI _plorment
. of Anglo.Americn" troopll on Swiet fIOil 10 be pouibl. Jor 1M lime being. H"nce
ROOlIeWlI and ChurclaiU tkcidfllj to clind tIafIi,. coup tJI tA" nearut and ,..ltJIivtJly l,,4M
perilotu objflClifJe. TlMi,. ideo WlU 10 Ila_ t/aei,. pt'Of1IiNory noCe to Stalin 01 t1tfI
COllI oj tJae Mpku l'rencA notio,., 10 reaM t1tfI MediUrranean. and at tM «1_ ti",,,
to «1fJe u.-l_ tit. A..,. ddotu around .4JTiN tlaroug/t wakIr. i"Juted willa U-boau.
T0d4y t1Ie eye. of t1Ie tIIOf'ld ore concentnJI«l "" NortA Africa. Wlaot prwpecU
MIl t1Iere Jor a mobiliwiora of tA" conti""'" by t1Ie AUtu' Since it ill a ",",ion,
rIOt oj mobilizing men or natural ,.llfIOtll"OU, bw oj rnobUmft{l routu oj communica·
tion. I0Il or" publillh,ng a "'udy oJ A.fri«Jn problemIr oj communication toAic.\ Ittu
beeR in fYI'IIparotion Jor _al mantM. W" Ilal!e nol conJlMd _HI_ to tAoH
GNlIfI itttlGtJ«l wrlll in NOfJfImber but MfJe inclvd«l aU IAoH PO"" oJ AJrieo tohiM
aN IUrcl, to be oj imporlon« in tA.. wor. A. Jor 011 _ know. flO ...c.\ tldGiletI~
Ittu ,., appearetl i" pri,.,. The _,." maIf/ri.al WlU _pplietl 10 VII br
fIZPI/rlII, among """" Dr. Aulillio of Tolcyo (a f- Aiglt o§fcial in t1Ie Italian
Colonial SfII'T1ice in Afr'co), a French 8peciali« in .4/ricon rnotIen, and II GtrmGn
uplor.,. who ha. Cr088ed Afriro by car.-K.M.
THE Anglo-American Allios had threepossible ways of reaching the Medi-terranean from the Atlantic without
using the long, dangerous detour around
Africa: (1) through French North Africa,
i.e" Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia; (2)
through French West Africa, Le., from
the river systelD8 of the Senegal and
Niger northwest across the Sahara; and
(3) through the "waist" of Africa, i.e.,
from the Gulf of Guinea to the Nile.
We shall deal with the first two first,
8ince they are closely related and are
now in the limelight.
AFRIOA-WHITE AND BLAOK
French Africa is cut in two by the
~xpanse of the Sahara Desert. Until
recent years it could be considered as
being made up of two distinct parta
without any overland connection be-
tween them. Medieval Arab geographers
have named these two parts "Blad-es-
Sudan," country of the black people, and
"Blad-cs-Beidan," country of the white
people.
In the north there is "White" Africa,
which, from Morocoo to Tunisia, shows a
certain geographical unity, being a com-
paratively narrow strip between the coast
in the north and the Atlas Mountains
and the borders of the Sahara in the
south; Nevertheless, it covers an area
larger than that of France and Spain
put together, with an average density of
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population of thirty-eight inhabitanta per
square kilometer in Algeria, Tuniaia, and
Spanish Morocco, and fifteen inhabitants
per square kilometer in French Morocco.
This region is separated from Europe by a
distance of only eight miles at the Straits
of Gibraltar and of eighty-six miles
between Sicily and Tunisia. It is joined
to the Near East through Tripolis, which
in ancient times was a muoh-used route
of emigration and invasion, while the
obstacle of the Sahara separated it from
the rest of Africa.
On the other side of the Sahara begins
tropical "Black" Africa. One of the
chief dift'erences between these two re-
gions is to be found in their natural routes
of communication. In "Black" Africa,
the river systems of the Senegal ·and the
Niger, navigable in part or according to
8e88On, were the main routes of European
penetration; while in "White" Africa rivers
are either nonexistent or not navigable.
The nature and development of the con-
nections in the interior were largely in-
ftucnced by this fundamental dift'erence.
JlOROOOAR ZIGZAGS
From southern Morocco at the foot of
the Atlas Mountains, whose eternal snows
sparkle even in August under the African
sun, from the palm groves of Marrakesh,
a railway connection has gradually been
established, section by section, to the
Tunisian port of Sfax.
In Morocco there were at the end of
lOll, 1,600 kilometers of narrow-gauge
.(60 centimeter) railway, which, although
rendering good eervice, could not be
anything but provisional and inadequate.
The railway followed picturesque routes,
and exigencies of low gradients as well
as reasons of economy had obliged the
builders-in some cases the French army
engineering corps-to adopt, for certain
mountainous parts of the line, sections
made up of switchbacks, that is, straight
sections of rail with switches at each end,
so that the trains ran alternately back-
wards and forwards in a zigzag and thus
laboriously climbed up the mountain
side. So laboriously, indeed, that the
passengers, who had got out at the begin-
Ding of this procedure, had plenty of time..
after walking to the top, to watch th.i8'
toilsome zigzag course, unless they wer&
called upon to descend again and asaist
the locomotive to move the little carriage8.
Gradually a normal-gauge network was-
developed from Casablanca via Rabat to-
Fez and was completed in 1925. It
linked up with the TangierfFez line.
which was completed in 1927. Then
came the section CasablancafMarrakesh
in 1028, and finally in 1034 the oon-
nection from Fez to Vjda, where the-
Moroccan system WL\S linked up to that.
of Algeria. From V jda there is also a
line running southward into the interior
to Bou Aria.
In Algeria we note the successful carry-
ing out of two successive railway pro-
grams. The first was laid down in 1857
and completed by 1800. It connected the-
ports of Oran and Algiers and followed
the coast to the east. The second
program, that of 1007, succeeded twenty
years later in completing the railway
network of Algeria with the construction
of eeverallines running south (to Colombo
Bechar. to Jelfa, and to Touggourt) and
of others linking this network with
Morocco and Tunisia.
In Tunisia there existed before the-
French Protectorate a short line in the
neighborhood of Tunis, built by an Ital-
ian company, and the connection Tunisl
Bane. By 1022 many new lines had
been added, creating an efficient network
along the coast as well as in the interior.
In this way, a transversal connection
has gradually been created, materially
uniting North Africa, of which it con-
stitutes a sort of spine onto which ar&
grafted the secondary sections that link
up the parta with the interior and that.
are the beginnings of future trans-
continental connections. "White" Africa,
incidentally, has good coal deposits and
ample water power, which has helped to-
electrify a large part of the railway
system.
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0000 ROADS A~D PORTS
Throughout almost it.s whole length,
tbi,. iron network is paralleled by mod-
C'rn. asphalt-surfaced roads which all?w
of donse, swift motor traffic and of which
there are 80 many that we could not
show them on our map. This is partic-
ularly the case in Morocco, where the
even contours and the absence of agricul-
turo at tho time of construction permitted
some 4.000 kilometers of main roads and
2.500 kilometers of side roads to be laid
out. usually perfectly straight. and suf-
ticil'ntly broad. In Algeria there are
f).000 kilometers of cxcellcnt main roads
and 25,000 l<ilometers of good sido roaus.
In Tunisia. 5.000 kilometers of main
roads, as well as tracks more or less w('11
kept up, complete the road network ?f
Nort.h Africn. Both tho road and rall-
wav networks have been developed par-
all~1 to the progress of :Frcnch penetra-
tion and according to the demands of
the development and exploitation of the
land.
"White" Africa is served by a number of
good port. In ~Iurucco, the ports open
to trade beforo the ProtectoratC'. as well
as those which were added nfterwards,
were for a long time no more thnn Op(,1l
roadsteads where ships anchored onshore,
while goods and pas.<rengers could only blS
loaded and unloaded by means of lighters.
Casablanca did not become a large,
modern port with deep-water berths UJ~tif
gigantic improvements had been C<'lrr~ed
out, among which were the constructIOn
of a seawall a mile and a half long llnd
the installation not only of up-to-date
equipment for the loading o! phospbates
but also of coal yards, gram elevatoJ's.
ami electric crancs. In 1939, Casablanca
handled nlmost all of the 3,900,000 tons
of Moroccan traffic, leaving only some
flOO,OOO to 600,000 tons to Sufi, Port
Lyautey, and Agl\dir.
FRANCE'S GRANARY
In Algeria, tho principal ports (aU
very well equipped) of Algiers, Oran,
Bono, Philippeville, and Bougie, as well
as numerous smaller ports, have a share
in the ten million tons of goods imported
or exported, that of Algiers and Ora!!
being more than fifty per cent of thIS
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African Routes of Communications
amount. Tunisia has four well-equipped
ports, Bizerte, Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax,
the latter, thanks to its phosphates,
handling more than half of the 3,800,000
tons of Tunisian trade.
Beforo the outbreak of the present war,
approximately 86 per cent of the exports
Qf French North Africa went to l'''rance.
In view of the fact that practically all
foreign trade has been stopped through
the war, it can be assumed that almost
the entire exports of these colonies went
to France during the last two years.
Besides phosphates and ores, the bulk of
these exports was made up of foodstuffs
and wine. ~"'or example, in 1936 the
following were exported from Algeria and
TUlli.'in:
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1.000.000 sheep
1)19.200 tona cerM1a aDd cereal products
125.000 .. {ruU and vept&blee
16,000 .. tobacco
8.700 •• olive oU
The export of phosphates. which are
urgently needed for French agriculture.
amounted in 1936 to 563,000 tons. It
can be soon from this that France de-
pends to a considerable extent on her
North African colonies for her food
supplies.
Thus, on the whole, UWhite" Africa
has been very well developed and
opened up by a close network of lines of
communications, so important in modem
fJtrategy.
TRACKS IN THE SAND
As we go to pretl8. the picture in North
Africa is too confused to enable us, on
the basis of the many contradictory re-
ports, to predict with any accuracy the
further course of the Allied venture in
French North Africa. But one thing is
-certain: even if events should take the
most fa vorable turn possible for the
Anglo-Americans, that is to say, if they
should 8UCCeed in occupying all of French
North Africa, it would be very difficult
for them to ensure adequate supplies for
their African expeditionary army in the
face of the Axis strength in the Mediter-
ranean. This has even been openly ac-
knowledged by Winston Churchill and
Colonel Frank Knox, US Secretary for
the Navy, in recent statements.
For this reason, the question whether
the Anglo-American troope in Frenoh
North Africa can be supplied from the
south, i.e., the regions of the Senegal and
the Niger, by overland routes is of great
importance. These routes lead across
the Sahara.
The Sahara is one of the most formi-
<lable obstacles to traffic known anywhere
in the world. Crossed by caravans, by
nomads, and by bandits, along routes
which varied according to the relatively
greater or lesser safety of the journey as
well a8 to the possibilities of the barter
trade carried on in ·the past, it has soon
the long treks gradually disappear, treks
"'hich were so difficult in the face of the
aridity of the country and the almost
complete absence of any l'C8OUl'OO8.
The suppression of slavery and slave
traffio removed with one stroke the
mainstay of the trans-8ahara caravan
trade. And now European penetration
has radically ohanged the whole trans-
portation system of the desert. Camels,
formerly the only means of transport,
lost favor, and the old caravan routes
were one by one either changed or aban-
doned. The first crossings by motorcar
were made in 1923 from Touggourt to
Timbuktu and from Colomb Bechar to
the Niger by Adra.r-OuaBBen and Tessalit.
Today two regular motor lines through
the center of the Sahara maintain the
connections Algiers/Gao and AlgiersfKano.
Thanks to the motorcar, the Niger is
now only six days away from Algiers.
These routes lead for thousands of kilo-
meters through entirely uninhabited, life-
1688 desert. Water and gasoline must be
brought from a distance and are stored
at way-statioDB, called "bid0n8" (flask,
tank). The most impOrtant of them,
Bidon 5, and the deeolate waste sur-
rounding it, are shown in one of our
photographs.
REA.VY GOING
Besides these, there is another motor
route 3,500 kilometers long which con-
nects Casablanca via Agadir and St.
Louis with Dakar, leading through the
western pa.rt of the desert and around
Spanish Saha.ra (Rio de Oro). Formerly,
this distance was covered by camel
ca.ravan in three months, whereas now it
takes less than ten days by car. The
first 500 kilometers south of Casablanca
are a good motor highway, the rest is
desert track. The reader should not
assume that these desert routes are
paved highways. For long distances,
cars have to travel over wide expanses
of hard-packed desert sand, with nothing
to show the way but the tracks left by
the preceding car. Consequently, it
sometimes happens that a truck gets
lost, especially after a sandstotm. To
cope with this, a striot system ofcontrol
is maintained at the various stope along
the routes. The departure of every car
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is telegraphed on to the next stop, and
the next stop confinn.e its arrival to the
preceding one. When a car is overdue, a
search party is sent out and, if this fails,
planes go out to look for the missing
vehicle.
The fact that today there are motor-
cars driving along these trans-Sahara
roads from "White" to "Black" Alrica
should not cause us to forget that traffio
between "White" Africa (and beyond
that, France and Europe) and "Black"
Africa does not go by land but by sea.
According to recent information from
Vichy, some 50 tons of goods were trans-
ported every day in both directions by
the desert routes. This is only a tiny
fraction of the goods traffio between the
two parte of French West Africa. The
difficulties involved in transporting more
are so great that Dakar, after the 1088
of its maritime connections, is practically
out off from France. Of course, the
Sahara presents the same difficulties to
everyone else, and if we consider how
much trouble it has caused the French to
!lend such small quantities across the
Sahara, we can imagine how much more
difficult it would be to send hundreds of
trucks or even a whole army across.
There was an air route acr0B8 the Sahara
from "White" to "Black" Africa which
led from Algiers via Bidon 5, Gao,
Segou, Bamako, and Kayes to Dakar.
Dakar was also linked "ith Algiers by an
air route along the coast via St. Louis,
Agadir, Casablanca (which had direct air
connections with France), Rabat, Fez,
and Vjda.
THE TRANS-SAJIABA. PRO.JEC'J'
In 1860, Banoteau prophesied: ''Who
knows whether one day steam, connecting
Algiers with Timbuktu, may not bring
the tropics to within six days of Paris'"
From 1875 to 1028, the id~a of a trans-
Sahara railway has known altemating
periods of enthusiasm and oblivion. In
1028, an "organization for the study of a
trans-Sfhara railway intended to connect
North Africa with French West Africa"
was created by law. But, in spite of the
consulting committee established by
the same law, in spite of the wishes of
local bodies and chambers of commerce,
and in spite of the demands of the supreme
council of national defense, nothing was
done. In 1934 in Vichy, a Congress of
the French Radical-Socialist Party pre-
sided over at that time by Edounrd
Berriot (former President of the Chamher
of Deputies who was recently placed in
detention by the Government of Marshal
Petain) discussed among other things the
trans-Sahara railway project and - con-
demned it.
And it was in Vichy again that, on
March 22, 1941, a decree of Marshal
Petain's made up for errors formerly
committed by ordering the immediate
construction of this railway, adopting the
route proposed in 1930. This route uses
as its first section the existing line from
Vjda to Colomb Bechar. From there on
it leads through some oases to Adrar and
Reggan, and goes as far as In Tassit,
after a journey of 700 kilometers across
the Tanesruft, the "Desert of Thirst,"
the driest part of the Sahara. There
are 3,535 kilometers of railway line to
be built, with few embankments or ex-
cavations, no tunnels, and only one bridge
of any importance. Because of its ex-
treme simplicity, the constnlCtion will
not take more than three or four years.
The employment of Diesel electrio 1000-
motives and the profile of the lino will
allow of an average speed of 60 kilometers
an hour, which will mean a total of two
days from the Mediterranean to the
Niger.
The arc of the great circle that joins
Europe to South Africa passes through
Marseilles and Algiers and approximately
coincides with the projected line, whose
already existing or still to be constructed
branch lines "ill open communications
with South America through Dakar and
with the Indian Ocean through Vganda.
DAKAR
The original French plan in West
Africa was based on making use of tho
natural routes through linking up the
navigable sections of the Senegal and
Niger Rivers. But since the Senegal is
TIl\' straight, lint', the mllrk of the whit,(' man 11\ the desert. Here t.he roaclhl'll IS being \'Ollstl'lll:fc'd
for the trat'ks of the flltllre Trans-Sahara Hailway
RAILS ACROSS THE SAHARA
dllwll Oil
A P.VIOIl, two planes in front of a gasoline depot, some de-wheeled slPI·ping ears on conlTI'fl'
a" li\'ing qllarters in nn endless gray-hlack expanse, completely flat., with t.lw pit,ill'ss slln hllrllill,!.(
it t\\"('(n' hours a day-this is what a futlll'l' stop Ull the Trans·:-;ahal'a Hailway look" lik .. I1IlI1'
Riclon :..
hloeks
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100.000 KILOMETERS OF ROADS
THE RAOE ACROSS AFRICA
Beside the two routes from the Atlantio
to the Mediterranean already discussed
-through "White" and through "Black"
French Africar-there are also possibilities
for a west-east connection from the Gulf
of Guinea to the upper Nile. The fact
that there is no good railway cOll11ection
on this route can be traced to the politics
of that country which is today in urgent
need of this cross connection-Great
Britain.
-peanuts. bananas. cocoa. palm oil-
which can only be further developed in
the same measure as the means of their
transportation.
To those routes whose usefulness was
questionable because of the absence of
beasts of burden and because of the
length of the journeys. automobile trans-
portation has offered a new possibility of
development. The network of roads in
French West Africa has increased con-
siderably within a very short time. grow-
ing from 15.000 kilometers in 1923 to
50.000 in 1928. In 1939 it consisted of
more than 100.000 kilometers. running
parallel to the existing railways or en-
suring those connections which. though
planned. have not as yet been linked up
by rail. A part of these
roads has been built firmly
enough to be used through·
out the year; but the greater
part can as yet be used
only during the dry season.
By these various routes-
water. rail. and highway-
four million tons are trans-
ported annually to the sea
Dakar ports. Of this amount, Dakar
the use of alone absorbs 2.600.000 tons. depriv-
ing St. Louis. which is obstructed
by the sand bar of the Senegal River.
of its former position of a great
port of Africa. The French ports on the
Gulf of Guinea are only secondary ports.
where loading and unloading operations
are difficult in bad w.eather owing to the
ships having to anchor in the open sea.
navigable only 8.8 far 8.8 Kayes from
August 15 to October 15 and only for
vessels with a draft of fifteen feet, it
seemed more advisable to build a railway.
The lines from Dakar to St. Louis (264
km.), opened in 1885, and from Kayes to
Bamako on the Niger (555 km.), were
the first to be built, the latter, although
8tarted in 1881, not being completed till
1904. Then a 667-kilometer railway con-
nection from Dakar to Kayes W8.8 com·
pleted in 1923. and recently the line
Bamako/Segou W8.8 built. Thus a railway.
consisting of some 1.500 kilometers of
uninterrupted rail. connects Dakar with
Segou. bringing the Middle Niger within
two days of the coast.
In view of the level contour of the
country in the savannah region. the con-
struction was comparatively easy. the
only important obstacles
being forest areas and the
crossing of streams. which
necessitated engineering
feat-s that were sometimes
of considerable extent.
However. the absence of
fuel offers a grave problem
for the maintenance of the
railway. a problem which
can apparently only be
solved by electrification and
vegetable fuels.
The French coastal colonies between the
mouth of the Senegal and of the Niger
have various routes of penetration into
the interior: in Senegal the route we
mentioned above; in Guinea. that which
connects the port of Konakri with the
upper. navigable reaches of the Niger at
Kurussa. (extending over 662 kilometers.
this line was completed in 1924); in the
Ivory Coast. a railway connecting Abid-
jean across the jungle with Bobo Diu-
lasso. destined to become an important
junction for branch lines: one to Segou.
where it will link up with the Trans-
Sahara and Senegal Railways, and the
other to Niamey on the Niger; and in
Dahomey, several comparatively short
lines from the coast to the interior.
All these lines were built to transport
the various resources. mainly agricultural
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The plan for a C1'088 connection of this
kind between the west and east coaate
was not born only now from the present
demands of Allied warfare. It originates
from the time when France took up the
fight for a west-east route through Africa
from the Senegal River to French Soma-
liland against Cecil Rhodes' idea of the
south-north Cape-to-Cairo route. The
railway and road projects thrust forward
from Cairo and Capetown were parried
by the French with railwa~'s leading from
Dakar into the hinterland of Senegal
and from Djibouti in French Somaliland
into the interior of Ethiopia. In the
Sudan, on the upper reaches
of the Nile, a territory which
at that time was a political
no-man's-land, the two lines
had one day to Cl'088.
Hence the battle for the
Sudan became the peak of
Anglo-French tension. The
world held its breath: Was
France going to complete her
empire from Dakar to Djibouti
first, or England hers from the
Cape to Cairo1
In 1896 began the historic race for the
Sudan. The Englishman, Lord Kitehener,
moved up the Nile with an Anglo-
Egyptian force, while the French com-
mander Marchand came marching from
the west with his troops. When Kitehener
arrived at Fashoda on the Upper Nile in
September 1898, he found it in Marchand's
hands. While the two forces lay opposite
each other, waiting, the diplomatic war
was raging between London and Paris.
Who would wint
France in those years was, of her own
desire, not free in her decisions. All her
political considerations were influenced
by the desire for revenge on Germany
for the lost war of 1870. This revenge
was not possible without the friendship
of England. So France sacrificed the
reality of the Nile for the dream of the
Rhine. Today, France has neither the
Nile nor the Rhine, and England has
inflicted many a new Fashoda on her-
in Syria, in Madagascar, in Equatorial
Africa-and has now even invaded
France's most important poesessions, her
colonies in North Africa.
While embittered France withdrew
after Fashoda to continue to concentrate
on her idea of revenge, England did much
towards accomplishing her Cape-to-Cairo
connection. But the irony of fate often
8008 to it that things tum out quite
di1ferently from what one expecta: the
north-south route acl'088 Africa estab-
lished by England in dispute with France
is today unimportant compared with the
west-east line from West Africa to the
Nile, in whose development
France was hindered by Eng-
land.
Ships from New York re-
quire two months to reach the
Red Sea around the Cape of
Good Hope, and less than half
that time to reach the west
coast of Africa. Today, ship-
ping spaee is precious for the
Allied powers. Consequently,
the Anglo - American powers
have made every effort to organize their
supply lines via Central Africa. French
Equatorial Africa is in the hands of de
Gaulle, that is to say. in the hands of
the Anglo-Americans; the Belgian Congo
is also at their disposal, and neutral
Liberia was recently occupied by them.
The occupation of Liberia has more
than only strategic aignificance. When
American troops landed in her capital,·
Monrovia, they symbolically revealed how
far their country has moved from the
traditional and proven principles of its
foreign policy. Monrovia was named in
honor of President Monroe, that American
President whose name is a synonym for
the view that the United States should
not interfere in foreign spheres. As a
commentator has recently remarked,
America has replaced the Monroe Doctrine
by the Monrovia Doctrine.
THE PORTS OJ' WEST A.FJUOA
What possibilities are open to the
Allies after they have occupied long
stretehes of the west coast of Africa!
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TJInEE ROUTES TO THE NILE
In spite of the great development of
air communioations, it is nevertheless
advisable to begin by examining the-
possibilities of the land routes. Not only
can these latter generally transport far
greater quantities of goods, but they are
also indispensable for air communica-
tions-for the transportation of fuel and
spareparts, for
the building
of airfields,
ete.
On theDark
Continent
there are to-
day three-
routes of com-
m unicatioD8
from west to
cast whic b
have strategio
importancefor
the Allies.
According to
their starting
and terminal
points, we
shall call them
the Nigerial
Sudan, the
Cameroons/
Sudan, and
the Cong 0/
Ugandaroutee.
a few thoUBand onl\". Pointe Noire and
Matadi aro well ~heltered, but landing
facilities arc poor and not equipped to
handle large tonnages.
• U...... A.a.C .....
• UncI.,. VIChy ( ..........
o Und.rAlli.d C roI
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In order to find an auswer to this ques-
tion, it is first necessary to inve tigate
tho value of the ports at their disposal.
Those ports which might be useful as
tarting points for overland tran. port
across the continent and accessible for
large supplies of heavy war material are
limited. Most African ports sutl'er from
the absence of a sheltered anchorage and
the lack of modern wharves. Besides
up-to-date Dakar, there are only three
fairly well-equipped ports: Freetown,
which has an exoellent, well-fortified
harbor and a
population of
more than
50,000; Lagos,
with a popula.-
tion of ap-
proximately
135,000 and a
spacious, well-
protected har-
bor for large
Ii nors; and
Duala, situat-
ed on the
estuary below
the contIuence
of several
large rivers,
where steam-
ers areberthed
along the rail-
way leading
in I and. All
other ports
aro quite in-
adequate.
Bat h u r s t is Sphol'C6 of InBuonC8 in Africa
situated on a swampy island and The most northerly route runs via
has a population of only 9,000. Lake Chad, which is accessible via the
Monrovia lies at the mouth of the fairly good communication system of
St. Paul River, which is blocked Nigeria and by a motor highway from
to large vessels hy a formidable sand bar, Dualn. in the French Cameroons which
so that these have to anchor in the open turns north at Yalmde. Kano, about
sea. The population numhers only 6,000. halfway to tho lake, is connected by rail
Accra, capital of tho <":old Coast, has also with Lagos and Port Harcourt; moreover,
only an open allchorage. Port Harcourt the lower Niger River is navigahle from
is situated on tho Nigel' Delta and so its mouth as far as tho point where it
boasts of a sheltered anchorage. Libre- strikes the railroad from Lagos. There
ville in French Gabon is quite ullimpor- is also a motor road (not indicated on
tant 8S a port ami has a population of our map in its westernmost section>
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which runs parallel to the railway line
from Lag08 and continues on beyond
Kano to Kuka. The m08t difficult sec-
tion is that from Lake Chad to E1 Fasher,
leading as it does through hilly desert
oountry over a caravan trail some 1,200
kilometers long. From El Fasher, trans-
port facilities consist merely of a motor
road and only after El Obeid of a narrow-
gauge railway. The problems involved
can be surmised if one considers that, in
'Order to transport the equivalent of a
medium-sized steamer, 1,500 trucks or
about 40,000 camels are required. The
total distance from Lagos to Alexandria
is about 6,000 kilometers.
RIVERS AND JUNGLlIl
A second overland route leads from
Duala in the French Cameroons via
Yaunde over a through motor road to
Bangui, which is situated on the navi-
gable part of the Congo system. River
boats go upstream from Bangui to Nian-
gara, which is linked with Juba on the
upper Nile by a motor road. Over this
route, too, the distances to be covered
by motor vehicles aggregate some 1,500
kilometers, which tends to limit the
'Capacity of the route considerably.
The third route passes through the
Belgiall Congo. This rich colony has
been taken over entirely by the Allies,
.and on July 15, 1942, the Belgian ex-
Prime Minister declared that the Belgian
-Congo was rapidly becoming an American
road to the Middle East. No 8hipping
is possible on the lower reaches of the
<:Ongo on account of its cataracts. Ships
Can only start from Stanley Pool, a vast
pool formed by the river between Brazza·
ville and Kinshasa. Stanley Pool is
linked with the coast by two railways,
-one running from Pointe Noire to Brazza-
ville and the other from Matadi to Kin-
shasa. Wood-burning river boats carry
:goods from Stanley Pool over a distance
of 1,700 kilometers to Stanleyville on
the Congo and to Buta, Bambili, and
Niangara on its tributaries. All these
places are linked up by motor roads,
whioh in turn connect with the road
leading from Niangara to Juba.
CONGO COJOlUNICAT10n
At first sight, this route seems to offer
considerable possibilities. However, the
Congo region contains extraordinary dif-
ficulties for transportation. The mOlt
serious obstacle of the Congo system
is to be found in the limited capacity of
the narrow-gauge railways from the coast
to Stanley Pool. They lead through
extremely mountainous terrain over some
400 kilometers. As a matter of fact,
the line from Pointe Noire had to be
constructed because, even in peacetime,
the MatadifKinshasa line could not handle
the traffic, so that goods had to be
stored for months in Matadi for lack of
transportation facilities. This bottleneok
waa the main cause for a large portion
of the country's exports, especially the
copper from the Katanga district, being
shipped by rail via the Portuguese colony
of Angola to Bengnella.
There are two more traffic arteries in
the Belgian Congo, both ending in Stanley
Pool. The first is a railway from the
southeastern comer of the colony, a
continuation of the line running north-
ward from Capetown. It leads via Buka-
ma to Port Francqui, whence river boats
go down a Congo tributary to Stanley
Pool. The other one runs from Bukama
northward by way of another Congo
tributary to Kongolo, whore goods must
be transshipped by rail to Kindu. There
another reshipment takes place by boat
to Ponthierville. The Stanley Falls fur- .
ther down the river must be circumvented
by a railway to Stanleyville, whence
Congo steamers carry the goods to Stan-
ley Pool. All this necessitates frequ~nt
transshipment and makes transportation
slow and very cumbersome. The com-
bined capacity of these two routes,
however, again depends on that of the
two narrow-gauge railways from Stanley
Pool to the coast.
CONSTANT TRANSSHIPMENTS
The traffic down the Nile valley through
the Sudan is also faced by severe diffioul-
ties. From Juba, the Nile is navigable
via Khartoum to Berber, although the
vessels plying on the Upper Nile cannot
carry more than a hundred tons. In
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Berber, the cargoes must be unloaded to
be taken by a narrow-gauge railway
either to Wadi Haifa, 600 kilometers
from Berber, where the Nile becomes
navigable again, or to Port Sudan, some
400 kilometers from Berber, for shipment
via the Red Sea. The total distance
from Pointe Noire to Cairo via this route
is about 7,200 kilometers.
Thus we may conclude that the chances
for large overland supplies along these
three routes from West Africa to the
Near East and North Africa are rather
-slim. The third, the Congo/Uganda(Nile
route, is the most important. But its
transport capacity is very small since
goods must constantly be transshipped
from rail to ship to truck, etc. Moreover,
the railway lines along the Lower Congo
and the Middle Nile have a narrow gauge
and hence a small capacity, and the
Congo steamer fleet was never meant
for large shipments. In addition to all
this, the fuel for motor transport in the
interior must be brought there over huge
·distances.
SECONDARY ROUTES
The remaining connections from the
west to the eaat coast of Africa would
not relieve the Allied shipping situation,
which is, after all, the main object of an
Afri('aD "Burma Road." Nevertheless, in
order to complete our study we shall
briefly review these connections.
The two Congo arteries are linked with
Dar cs Salaam by 8. railroad leading
from Kabalo to Al-
bertville on Lake
Tanganyika, whence
steamers go to Kigoma.
terminus of a railroad
from Dar es Salaam.
The Congo system is
also connected by rail
via Bukama with
Broken Hill, a junction of the line from
Capetown. Further south, another line
links Swakopmund in Southwest Africa
with Louren90 Marques, Beira, and Dur-
ban, only the latter being in British
hands, the others in Portuguese.
It is obvious that the saving in ship-
ping effected by using one of these routes
for sending supplies to North Africa
would be insignificant, since a large
merchant tonnage would still be needed
to negotiate the long, dangerous voyage
along the east coast of Africa.
There is, of course, the Cape/Cairo
route, 7,200 miles long, but this is entirely
inadequate for transporting reasonably
large supplies overland from south to
north. Lake Tanganyika is reached from
Capetown either at Albertville via. Bukam
or at Kasanga (on the southern shore
of the lake) by truck from Broken Hill.
The railroad Kigoma/Dar es Sa.la.am has
a branch line to the southern shore of
Lake Victoria, which must be crossed by
steamer in order to reach the railway
and motor highway completing the con-
nection with Juba. In all, the Cape/
Cairo route consists of 4,650 kilometers
of railway, 3,500 kilometers of waterways,
and 1,300 kilometers of roads. Nine
transshipments are necessary-five times
from railway to steamer, twice from
steamer to trucks, twice from railway to
trucks, and vice versa. These frequent
transshipments and the limited capacity
of some parts of the route, especially the
motor roads, seem to exclude the possi-
bility of any large-scale utilization of it.
PLANES ACROSS THE DESERT •••
Compared with the tremendous difficul-
ties faced by land communications, the
air traffic across Africa has somewhat
better chances. Consequently, airplanes
are being brought from America to the
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Allied bases in West Africa. The Ameri-
cans are, at least according to their own
recent announcement, going to make
Natal (on the northeast comer of Brazil,
approximately on the same latitude 88
the mouth of the Congo) the biggest
airport in the world. At the same time,
airfields are being feverishly laid out or
extended in such. ports as Bathurst,
Freetown, Monrovia, Accra, and Lagos.
Even before the war there were well-
developed airports in the interior of
Nigeria, and the experience then gained
by the British will now come in handy.
In this connection we may recall the
first massed flight right across Central
Africa which W88 made by British planes
in 1935 from Aden across the Sudan to
Nigeria and on to Britiah Gambia.
The air route Nigeria/Sudan leads via
Lake Chad, which lies embedded among
hills not more than 2,000 feet high. In
contrast to other African lakes, it con-
tains fresh water. Coming from Lagos,
after a flight over dense jungle, high
mountains, and deep gorges, one sees it
lying in surroundings which, in their
coloring and formation, announce the
beginning of the desert. From Lagos to
Lake Chad the distance is 1,350 kilo-
meters as the crow flies; and the desert
stretch from Lake Chad to Khartoum
roughly 2,100 kilometers. Consequently,
large bombers can fly the entire distance
from Lagoe to Khartoum without land-
ing in between, unless there are un-
favorable weather conditions. However,
pilots must reckon with the latter in
Africa, especially during the rainy 8e88On,
for meteorological conditions there do
not permit the aimplest of all remedies
for evading the inconveniences of bad
weather, namely, flying over it. Meteor-
ological formations in Africa riee to
great heights, so that flying even at a
height of 20,000 to 25,000 feet would not
avail, while on the other hand consider-
able elevations of terrain must be croesed.
All this allows of the assumption that
there will be appreciable losses.
••• .L"iD THEm LANDING FIELDS
In contrast to bombers, pursuit planes
will not be able to dispense entirely with
intermediate landings. A normal ma-
chine of this type carries fuel for 1.000
kilometers in its tank. For that reason.
airfields at Lake Chad and between it
and Khartoum are essential. Fort Lamy
is the center of the de Gaullist forccs and
the most important of the airports on this
route. It has already been bombed once
by German planes.
As we have already seen, Kuka and
Fort Lamy can be reached by railway,
river boat, and motor road. The next
airport to the east that has been opened
up by communications is EI Fasher,
which is connected by a motor road with
El Obeid. All transport between Lake-
Chad and EI Fasher must, however, go
by caravan trails, which are dependent
on the 8e88Ons and can only be used at
certain times because of the sandstorms.
or by transport planes. which, besides
war material. would also have to carry
gasoline cargoes.
Beside the air route Lagoe/Lake Chad!
El FasherfK.hartoum, another possible
air connection further south deserves
attention. Here the ports of Duala and
Libreville offer starting bases for planes.
which could fly via Bangui or Niangara
to Juba on the Nile, whence they follow
the south-north route. As we have seen,
there are railways and motor roads lead-
ing into the interior from Duala 88 well
aa from Libreville by which the n6Ce88&r'Y
gasoline supplies could be carried. Ban-
gui and the landing fields further east
would have to obtain fuel by the steamers
of the Congo system, perhaps even via
the Nile, which is connected with Nian-
gara by the motor road from Juba.
Still further south, Pointe Noire and
Boma offer starting points for crossing
the continent via Stanleyville to Juba.
Intermediate points on this route could
also be supplied by Congo shipping.
The chain of airfields along the Nile
haa been existing for years for the regular
Bights of the Imperial Airways. To the-
north of J uba, which is connected by
motor road and railway with Nairobi
and the port of Mombasa, this chain
consists of the following landing fields:
Bor, Malakal, Kosti, Khartoum, Berber,
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Wadi HaIfa, Aswan, Asyut, and Cairo.
South of Juba the main airports are:
Nairobi, Broken Hill, Johannesburg, and
Capetown.
THE PROBLEM OF FUEL SUPPLIES
The supplying of fuel for the air line
from West Africa to Egypt is compara-
tively easy in its eastern part. Besides
the 80 far very modest oil production of
Egypt, oil from Iraq and Iran can be
obtained overland via Palestine and
Egypt or by sea via the ports of Mom-
basa on the Indian Ocean and Port Sudan
on the Red Sea, both of which are con-
nected with the Nile by railway and
motor road.
The situation on the west coast of
Africa is far more difficult. The gasoline
must be brought from America across
the Atlantic in tankers, and the planes
must cover a distance of over 3,000
kilometers before they reach the Nile.
To transport an air fleet over this dis-
tance, hundreds of thousands of gallons
of fuel are needed. This must be stored
in readiness, in part in the airports of
the west coast and in part at the inter-
mediate landing fields, to which it
must be transported with great difficulty.
It remains to be seen how much truth
there is in the American claim that palm
oil, of which there is an abundance in
Central Africa, can be used in airplane
motors. At any rate,
it is not impossible
for the Allies to
bring American planes
and certain light-
weight war materials
to the Nile by air OVl'l'
this route, although
the difficulties in-
volved are consider-
able.
~ATURE'S OBSTACLES
So we see that the
problem of communi-
cations in Central
Africa is of a very
complicated nature.
The first glance at a
map seems to show that the con-
nection from West Africa to the Nile is
a brilliant idea that can easily be made
a reality. But as soon as one realizes
that the distance from Lag08 to Cairo is
twice the distance from Madrid to M08COw
and that the railwayless distance from
Kano to EI Obeid is as far as from London
to Ankara, one understands that the vast-
ness and unorganized state of the African
spaces are a gigantic obstacle to all the
programs 80 carefully figured out at the
desks of Washington and London. The
geographical realities of Africa cannot be
removed by programs and blueprints.
The Allies may build roads, railways,
bridges, river boats, and airports. But
all this must be done under the condi-
tions obtaining in Africa, where Man,
even modern, motorized Man, is only a
pygmy.
In order to visualize the difficulties in
Africa, one must bear in mind the climate
and vegetation of the Dark Continent,
which also affect the problem of an
African "Burma Road." In the north our
map shows the huge arid vastness of the
Sahara lying between the Mediterranean
and a line running across the continent
from the west coast via Lake Chad to
the Nile valley, the only exceptions
being a fairly narrow belt of grassland
and arable country in the northwest and
a few oases. There is another large
desert zone between
the Nile and the Red
Sea. The zones border-
ing on the Sahara are
much exposed to sand-
storms, which there-
fore affect the poesibil-
ity of overland sup-
plies from Lake Chad
to the Sudan. And
the vast expanse of
the Sahara itself offers
the m08t formidable
barrier to any direct
approach to North
Africa from the
south.
The coastal regions
along the Gulf of
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Since operations are still continuing 8.'J
we go to press, it would be premature to
speak about the success or failure of the
Anglo-American action. We have pur-
posely limited oUI'8elves in our article to
fundamental questions and have not dealt
with the details of the fighting of the last
few days. (The Anglo-American landings
are shown on our map on p. 373.) But there
is one thing that must be said concerning
the Anglo-American attack.
I t is a tragic fact that war has as a
rule little to do with morality. However.
there was nothing in this war of which
future generations in England and America
November 19~2, one is justified in lUlSum-
ming that a part of the publicity given
to Dakar was intended by the Anglo-
Americans themselves, first in order to
distract Vichy's attention from North
Africa, where the attack was actually to
take place, and secondly, in the hope,
through the appearance of strong Ameri-
can troop detachments on the borders of
the French colonial empire, to influence
France in her attitude toward the Axis.
For months the Anglo-Americans have
been trying to lure France away from the
rising new Europe. A few weeks ago
they revealed their intentions more clearly
than before, when Walter Lippman, one
of the leading political authors in America,
in an article appearing on October 30,
1942, in the New York Herald Tribum
advised France to reorientate herself and
to enter the war again at the side of the
USA and England. Perhape the landing
of Allied troope and arms in the vicinity
of French West Africa had more signif-
icance as a military demonstration in-
tended to influence Vichy than as a prep-
aration for attack.
The third possibility, the thrust through
North Africa, was hardly discussed in the
press. and it seems as if the Anglo-
Americans have succeeded in deceiving
the French Government and colonial
administration as regards their real in-
tentions and in finding them more or
less unprepared for the sudden attack in
November.
Guinea and the Congo territory are
covered with tropical jungle, with ample
rainfaU throughout the year which makes
life for white people extremely unhealthy.
Between the jungle and the desert zones
lie savannahs, sparse forests, and culti-
vated land, where we find either two
rainy seasons during the year or-in the
south and in the easternmost comer
opposite Arabi&--On1y one rainy &eason.
The moist climate of Central Africa is
ideal for mosquitoes, which accounts for
the prevalence of malaria. Another
deadly disease is sleeping sickness, which
has depopulated large areas and to
which the natives are particularly sus-
ceptible. SmaUpox also causes great
ravages among the negroes. The limited
production of foodstu.ffs and the absence
of cattle in regions infested with tsetse
flies necessitate the almost complete pro-
visioning of foreign troope with imported
food supplies.
THE ALLIES AND THE THREE ROUTES
Thus we have shown the three routes
which the Allies could take from the
Atlantic to the Mediterranean if they did
not want to go around the Cape. The
one we have dealt with last, the route
through Central Africa, was the one first
to be employed by the Allies. It was
probably conceived in 1941, and its
development was seriously undertaken as
early as the beginning of 1942, immediate-
ly after America's entry into the war. It
is very probable that the Allies, in spite
of their hopes to find a far more direct
approach to the Mediterranean through
French North Africa, will continue to
develop the route through Central Africa
in order to be prepared for any event.
The possibilities of an advance of the
Allies over the routes of "Black" Africa
were the second to attract world atten-
tion. This happened when the landing
of American troops in Liberia and at
other points on the north coast of the
Gulf of Guinea became known in the
late summer of 1942. These were the
months in which Dakar was mentioned
as the most likely goal of Anglo-American
aggression in Africa. After the events of
• • •
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should be more aahamed tha,n the
attack on the French colonial empire in
Africa. For in this case the attack
was directed. not only against the prestige
and power of Franoe-as in Syria and
Madagascar-but against her very life.
We have already pointed out to how
peat an extent France was dependent.
even in times of peace, on food suppUes
from her Afric8,n colonies. As a result
of the anti-European blockade of the
Allies, this dependence of France has
become far more serious. By staging an
attIWk against these colonial territories,
Washington and London have done some-
thing whioh, should they succeed, will
expose millions of French people to
starvation.
The guilt of Roosevelt and Churchill
is the greater since their action is
direoted against their former ally,
France. whose heroic fight in 1914 to
1918, symbolized by such names as that
of Petain, helped them to win the first
World War against Germany, and who
in 1039 was induced for the second time
to become the sword of the Anglo-
American poUcy against Germany.
We need not deal with the excuse with
which Roosevelt tried to cloak his aggres-
sion. namely, that he had to forestall a
German invasion of the French colonial
empire. For more than two years. the
Axis did not make use of the opportunity
of marching into the colonial empire of
defenseless France. Moreover. Churchill
himself dismissed Roosevelt's pretext
when he declared in his speech at the
Mansion House on November 11: "We
come to North Africa for the sole reason
of capturing a favorable starting point
for a new front against Hitler and
Hitlerism."
Since her collapse in 1940, France,
under the leadership of Marshal Petain,
has done everything in her power to
keep out of further war entanglements
and, like Germany, faithfully to adhere
to the terms of the armistice. She put
up with countless infringements of her
territory and her honor by the Anglo-
Americans without abandoning her neu-
traUty, in the hope that in this way she
would succeed in keeping out of the war.
In the years since Compiegne, she appUed
herself, under the most difficult condi-
tions, to her own reconstruction and to
the heating of her wounds. But this was
of no avail. The attack on Morocco and
Algeria and the natural countermeasures
on the part of the Axis have for the
second time involved her in the same
world war and, in the midst of a difficult
domestic rebirth, exposed her to new
suffering.
But just as every deed has more than
one result, the North Afrioan adventure
of Roosevelt and Churchill has brought
about something that is good. By mak-
ing North Africa a vital battlefield for
France as well &8 for the Axis, it has
brought France closer to the new Europe.
